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Abstract 
This paper discusses the so-called East-Berlin Affair in 
the late 1960s which is considered the single most 
important political and diplomatic aflair between South 
Korea and West Germany. In this research we aim to 
present an overview of the related archival materials 
available at the political archives of the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. h e  German documents from 
the political archives reveal that South Korean nationals 
suspected of espionage activities against South Korea were 
forced to leave for Seoul suddenly and that the 
intelligence offzcials from South Korea were deeply involved 
in the German territory for this unlawful operation. The 
West German government became very upset with this 
diplomatic aflair. Korean government eventually released 
all the accused who were later found guilty of espionage 
against South Korea. However, we notice some dzflerences 
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in diplomatic strategies between the two countries for 
solving the case at issue. 
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I. Introduction 
The single most important affair that burdened the 
political and diplomatic relations between South Korea 
and West Germany is the so-called East-Berlin Affair in 
the late 1960s.l) The objective of this research is to 
present an oveniew of the German archival materials 
contained in the political archives of the Federal Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Germany with respect to this 
unfortunate affair between Korea and Germany. In this 
affair, seventeen South Korean intellectuals, guest 
workers and students in West Germany were allegedly 
forced by South Korean government officials to return to 
South Korea for investigations, which later found most of 
them guilty of espionage against South Korea. Some 
South Koreans in the US, France, and Switzerland were 
also reported to have been involved in this espionage 
affair (volume 949, inventory 83). Some of them were 
blamed for having secretly visited North Korea via East 
Berlin and for having formed an espionage ring based in 
East Berlin for Pyongyang. The West German government 
1) cf. Inventory (Bestand)  83, Volumes ( B a n d )  948, 949, 950 and 951. See 
also IB5 inventory 37. 
was extremely upset at  that time, since the South Korean 
government officials conducted this covert operation 
against South Korean nationals on West German soil 
without informing the West German government, and 
therefore, West German sovereignty was severely violated 
by a foreign authority. 
11. The situational background 
The diplomatic relations between North Korea and 
East Germany were established on November 6, 1949, 
whereas South Korea and West Germany reopened their 
diplomatic ties on December 1, 1955. Before official 
diplomatic relations between South Korea and West 
Germany were established, the German Red Cross (Ger. 
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz) had already dispatched a hospital 
ship to South Korea during the Korean War in an effort 
to join the UN joint-missions to South Korea. German 
government documents show that, after diplomatic 
relations between the two countries were opened, South 
Korea sought to find ways to acquire some advanced 
knowledge in the areas of natural sciences, engineering 
and technology from Germany. This effort included 
various programs in Germany for training South Korean 
workers and students. During this time, the German 
government substantially supported and assisted the first 
five-year economic development plan of the Park Jung 
Hee Regime (the 3rd Republic) with various financial 
means. During the early and mid 1960s, the state heads 
of the two countries also paid mutual visits on friendly 
terms with each other. I t  was during this era that many 
South Korean intellectuals in and out of Korea were 
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accused of having had close contacts with the alleged 
North Korean espionage rings in East Berlin. It is also 
claimed that this political affair was closely related with 
the parliamentary election strategies of the Parks regime 
at that time. 
The first official diplomatic documents on this 
unfortunate affair available at the political archive of the 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs are contained in the 
volume (Band) 948 of the inventory (Bestand) 83. The 
volume starts with the official background reports made 
by the German Embassy in Seoul on June 21, 1967 that 
North Korean agent networks in Taegu and in Seoul were 
detected and destroyed by the South Korean CIA, and 
that North Korean armed agents intruded an eastern 
harbor of South Korea (Samchok) to stage a guerilla war 
(cf. Az.: KOS 04-02-07, Tgb.Nr.: 149167, Bericht Nr.: 
28/67). Other similar incidents were reported to have 
occurred in whch North Korean armed agents were 
detected in Chunyang in the district of Ponghwa and 
Munsan (approx. 30 krn north of Seoul). These violent 
activities of the North Korean agents and the 
counter-espionage actions of the South Korean troops and 
police became the daily agenda in the late 1960s. The 
agents from the North kept up an unrelenting campaign 
of attacks on various parts of South Korea, thus 
escalating the tension. South Korean military security 
forces and police were also killed throughout the country. 
This report written by a German military attache 
Oberstleutant (Lieutenant-Colonel) Druschkowitsch explains 
in detail how the inter-Korean situation became 
increasingly unstable by the destructive communist 
activities of North Korean armed agents and guerillas in 
June 1967. The German military attachit further 
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comments that the attacks launched by North Korean 
agents target not only the South Korean military forces, 
but also the civilians, thus setting the entire country 
under unrest and insecurity. It is of course not 
immediately clear in the report of the German military 
attache why these attacks by the North Korean armed 
agents occurred all of a sudden during this time, that is, 
in 1967. In this regard, one needs to understand the 
historical and political development of both North and 
South Korea after the Korean War. 
I t  is generally accepted that from the mid 1950s 
through 1960s, Kim I1 Sung put first priority on the 
rebuilding of the North Korean economy and military 
facilities after the Korean War. Especially during the late 
1950s, there was not much capability on the part of 
North Korea to mobilize military operations against South 
Korea, because every effort was made to rebuild the state 
infrastructure and industrial facilities that were 
completely destroyed during the war. In light of the 
priority given to the recovery efforts for the devastated 
industry in North Korea, it does not come as a surprise 
that Kim I1 Sung focused not on military measures but 
on peaceful propaganda when it came to the strateges 
and tactics for treating inter-Korean politics until the 
beginning of 1960. According to the History of North 
Korean provocations published by the South Korean 
Ministry of Defense (1998: 283), the period between April 
20, 1960 and August 15, 1970 is characterized as a 
period when North Korea pursued violent revolution for 
the Korean peninsula. This characterization makes sense 
because the Students' Revolution on April 19, 1960 in 
South Korea created disorder and confusion in South 
Korea and Kim I1 Sung wanted to take advantage of this 
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political chaos to strengthen the anti-government and 
communist activities in South Korea. This move is also 
connected with the fact that most communist 
infra-networks in South Korea were destroyed during the 
Korean War. 
Thus, it can be argued that during the 1960s, it was 
possible for Kim I1 Sung to concentrate more on the 
rebuilding of the North Korean military capability. One 
cannot overlook the fact that the recovery efforts for the 
North Korean economy were also successful compared to 
South Korea during this period. From 1967 on Kim I1 
Sung started to test the South Korean and U S  military 
security systems either by launching attacks on ships 
and planes or by sending armed agents and saboteurs, 
including guerrillas in large numbers. It should be noted 
it was during this time that one U S  intelligence boat 
named Pueblo was attacked and captured by North 
Korean forces on January 23, 1968. Meanwhile, this 
period was also marked by the political turmoil and 
tension between Park Jung Hee and the oppositions in 
South Korea. 
111. The evolvement of the affair 
On July 6, 1967, the State Secretary of the German 
Foreign Ministry in Bonn sent an Aide Memoire to the 
South Korean Ambassador, requesting an explanation of 
the sudden departure of a certain number of nationals of 
the Republic of Korea from the Federal Republic of 
Germany. From an archival material (July 5, 1967) 
released from the office of the Foreign ministry, it can be 
seen, for example, that a Korean pediatrician named Lee 
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who had been working at a university clinic at  Mainz 
was being escorted by three South Korean officials when 
from Paris, he sent an express airmail to his wife in 
Mainz, Germany, saying that he has to leave for Seoul 
suddenly and to stay there for a while. The university 
clinic director in Mainz was not informed of the sudden 
departure of Dr. Lee, and after two days of his 
disappearance the clinic director stopped paying Dr. Lee's 
salary. Tens days after his disappearance, the director 
filed a missing persons report to the police for the 
Korean doctor. The Korean nationals who were recalled to 
South Korea included academics, students and 
coal-miners, and they were investigated in Seoul for 
having possible contacts with North Korea. 
All these circumstances forced the concerned German 
authorities to conclude that these Korean nationals in 
Germany had to leave for Seoul suddenly without even 
having sufficient time to inform their close family 
members and friends in Germany. The various 
correspondences among German authorities such as 
Federal Criminal Office and police indicate that the 
Korean nationals left Germany without luggage and bags 
and that their personal belongings remained intact at  
their residences. 
In response to the first Aide M6moire from the 
German Foreign Ministry, the Korean Ambassador 
responded that "the investigation authorities in the 
Republic of Korea recalled 17 nationals of the Republic of 
Korea in the Federal Republic of Germany in connection 
with an investigation of large scale subversive and 
espionage activities of the North Korean Communist 
agents with the purpose of overthrowing the government 
of the Republic of Korea, thereby attempting to 
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communize the southern part of Korea." The Korean 
Ambassador General Choi, Duk Shin21 further stated that 
"in view of the urgency and secrecy of the case, the 
Korean authorities hastened to take prompt actions to 
persuade those who are involved in the case to return to 
Korea to appear before the Korean authorities" (cf. 
volume 948 1-111, inventory 83). 
With respect to this diplomatic affair the first official 
meeting between Korean Ambassador, General Choi, and 
the German State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs took place at  4 PM on July 6, 1967 at  the 
German Foreign Ministry in Bonn. At this arranged 
parley, the German State Secretary strongly demanded 
from the Korean Ambassador and his government to 
cooperate in the process of clearing up the sudden 
departure of Korean nationals whose names were already 
presented to the Korean Embassy. The diplomatic notes 
(Aufzeichnung ZA5 - 92.A/67) from the German side 
show that the Korean Ambassador first noticed that for 
the first time he was occupied with this annoying matter 
in such a personal dialogue. The Korean Ambassador was 
seen as  talung it for granted that the German Federal 
Government took this unfortunate matter so seriously. 
During the conversation with the German State Secretary, 
2) Ambassador Choi, who was a fanlous independence movement leader 
during the Japanese occupation and an anti-communist general during 
the Korean War, resigned from his post a couple of days after the 
espionage affair was brought to light. He later defected to the USA 
and joined the anti Park-Regime movement in the seventies and even 
joined a political group that forcefully occupied the South Korean 
Embassy in Bonn after the assassination of President Park. 
Ambassador Choi even defected with his wife later to North Korea in 
1986 after having visited Kim I1 Sung a few times. He died in 
Pyongyang in 1989. His father is known to have been the teacher of 
Kim I1 Sung at a 'Chundokyo' school named 'Hwa.sung.ui.sook'(~~& 
&@) during the 1920s in Manchuria (cf. Han 2000). 
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the Korean Ambassador further stated that during his 
incumbency he has always made efforts to improve the 
relations. not only between the two governments, but also 
between the two peoples. Ambassador Choi is said to 
have regretted that the matters have now evolved like 
this. At this interlocution, Ambassador Choi assured the 
German State Secretary that he would immediately report 
to his government with respect to the Aide memoire from 
the German government and hoped that he could quickly 
give precise answers to the questions raised therein. 
However, Ambassador Choi had already mentioned in 
the presence of the German State Secretary that he was 
informed by the South Korean government that evidently 
the Korean nationals in question were involved with an 
espionage ring organized by North Korean Embassy in 
East Berlin and that the South Korean government 
wanted to investigate them in Korea. The Ambassador 
Choi also emphasized that, contrary to the expectation, 
the dispatched officials from the South Korean police did 
not turn to the Korean Embassy but they directly 
contacted the concerned people and that the officials 
from Korea tried to persuade the people in question to 
return to Korea voluntarily. According to the Ambassador, 
the officials were also reported to have infonned the 
people in question that it would be best for the interest 
of the involved that they return to Seoul to clarify the 
accusations raised against them. Ambassador Choi 
further explained that so far as he was informed, the 
Korean nationals in question returned to Seoul 
voluntarily. However, we notice from various documents 
that the German government speculated that the Korean 
nationals were forced to return to Korea with various 
forms of threats and conciliation regarding family 
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members in Korea. In the first conversation with the 
Korean Ambassador Choi, the German State Secretary 
reminds the Korean partner of the concerns of the 
German public opinion at that time. 
From later correspondences from the Korean 
government to the German Foreign Ministry, we also note 
that the South Korean government stressed the fact that 
South Korea and West Germany are pursuing the 
common goal, namely fighting against communism in the 
world. Fighting against world communism together 
seemed to be an important cause for South Korea for 
seelung understanding from the German government, 
when it came to solving this unfortunate diplomatic affair 
between the two countries. 
The South Korean Foreign Minister, Choi, Kyu-Ha, at 
that time also expressed at the press conference in Seoul 
that the Korean nationals who returned to Korea 
complied with the Korean officials and that they returned 
to Seoul voluntarily (press conference on July 19. 1967). 
This official statement of the South Korean government 
did not satisfy the German government in Bonn at  all, 
since it turned out that the 17 Koreans disappeared from 
Germany suddenly at intervals of two to five days. 
German Federal Criminal Office, local police in North 
Rhine Westphalia, Federal Justice Ministry, and the 
Federal Ministry of Interior were mobilized to investigate 
the possible kidnapping cases thoroughly. 
The German Embassy in Seoul also expressed the 
critical opinion in a letter (dated July 20. 1967) to the 
Foreign Ministry in Bonn that, from the German point of 
view, it is obviously difficult to understand Korean laws 
such as the anti-communist law. In the eyes of Gennan 
diplomats, Korean authority was also reported to have 
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the attitude of downplaying the significance of the 
Western freedom and democratic process (report from 
German Embassy in Seoul on February 23, 1968). I t  also 
came to pass that a South Korean secret agency (KCIA) 
was deeply involved in the case. The official South 
Korean statement on the involvement of the secret agency 
was that the activity of the secret agency was needed to 
persuade the concerned Koreans to return to Korea on 
their own as  quickly as possible. However, the political 
archives contain a confidential Note Verbal (July 24, 
1967) of the Korean Embassy that the government of the 
Republic of Korea deeply regrets that officials of the 
Korean authorities acted in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, without prior consultation with or approval of 
the German authorities in this unfortunate matter. In 
this Note Verbal, the Korean government also wished to 
assure the German government that this kind of act will 
not recur in the future. 
The archival material at  the German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs also reveals that the most imminent and 
pressing concern of the German government with respect 
to this incident was the violation of the German 
sovereignty by a foreign authority on German soil. From 
the onset, the German government demanded from the 
South Korean government that the kidnapped South 
Koreans be released and be returned to West Germany at  
once, because only by doing so would the violated 
diplomatic relation be normalized and resumed. The 
archival sources of the German side also reveal that the 
German foreign ministry was under enormous political 
pressure from both the public opinion and the parliament 
(July 24, 1967, Aufzeichnung ZA 5-104A/67, vol. 949, 
inventory 83). The German diplomatic documents also 
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show that many Western newspapers in the US (e.g. New 
York Times) and in Europe (for example, France and 
Norway) reported on this happening with keen attention. 
An important piece of information for understanding 
the German diplomatic position is in order. It should be 
also noted that a similar kidnapping by a foreign 
authority happened previously in Munich on February 26, 
1963. The French secret agents conducted a covert 
operation in Munich, Germany to arrest a French 
right-wing extremist Antoine Argoud, a leading figure of 
an armed resistance movement in Algeria against De 
Gaulle. This act was executed without consultation with 
the German authority and on January 2, 1964 the 
French government finally declined to deliver Mr. Argout 
to the German authority, even though Germany exerted 
enormous diplomatic efforts to solve the case. This 
incident of course haunted German government as a 
sovereign nation for a long time. Germans at  that time 
felt 'wir sind immer noch ein besetztes Land' (we are still 
an occupied nation). The archival documents show that 
with respect to the Korean case, this French case with 
Argoud is constantly referred to within the circle of the 
top officials of the concerned German authorities. 
Despite the strong stance of the German government, 
the South Korean government wanted to investigate this 
case at all costs in an effort to deter possible attempts 
by people in and out of Korea to have contacts with 
North Korea. It turned out that seven Koreans in 
Germany visited North Korea once or twice between 
August 1961 and August 1965 under the instructions of 
the North Korean authorities, traveling either through 
Soviet Russia or China. It is not surprising that South 
Korean government constantly mentions the connections 
AN ARCHZVE-BASED ANALYSIS OF - 13 
with espionage activities of North Korea in view of the 
situational background explained in section 2. According 
to the Aide Memoire (July 24, 1967) from the Korean 
embassy, we can also see that the South Korean 
government shared the opinion that by means of a wide 
range and sophisticatedly organized network extending 
throughout free European nations, the North Korea has 
been infiltrating agents secretly into the Republic of 
Korea. 
Upon the demand of the German government, 
however, the government in Seoul made arrangements 
such that three South Korean diplomats who were 
allegedly involved in and responsible for the kidnapping 
cases had to leave Germany for Seoul immediately and 
that five South Koreans who were recalled to Korea were 
released very soon and could fly back to Germany. As for 
the remaining Koreans, the Korean government expressed 
the opinion that they would be given the possibility to 
proceed to Gerrnany of their own will when they were 
cleared of suspicion in the course of the investigation. 
This position of South Korea further aggravated the 
diplomatic relations with West Germany in the years to 
come. 
It should be also noted that the main concern of the 
opposition party (NDP: New Democratic Party) a t  that 
time in South Korea was not the fair treatment of the 
Korean nationals from Germany, but the sensitive 
diplomatic issues that might rapidly deteriorate the 
relationship between South Korea and West Germany. 
The view on communism is also portrayed in South 
Korea differently than in Germany. The German Embassy 
in Seoul also reported that communism in Korea is not 
just a matter of political ideology, but a matter of life 
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and death, given the fact that South Korean authority, 
police and civilians were harassed quite often by armed 
agents from the North during that time. In the archival 
materials we find that these circumstances on the Korean 
Peninsula were treated and interpreted cautiously when it 
came to the diplomatic maneuvers of the German side. 
The German foreign ministry recorded at that time that 
the German media were extremely unhappy with, and 
furious at, the attitudes and actions of the South Korean 
government and that many German universities, academic 
and cultural organizations, and prominent figures 
including Nobel laureates handed protest letters to the 
German government, the Korean Embassy in Bonn, and 
the Korean government in Seoul (cf. Bestand 83, Band 
95 1). Finally, the German government threatened the 
South Korean government with the possibility of 
&scontinuing the development aids and projects that 
were promised or on-going for Korea (cf. Bestand 37, 
Band 4 16, 82.70.92.23). The on-going project for inviting 
Korean coal-miners to Germany was also frozen for the 
time being (cf. Bestand 83, Band 951). The development 
aids also included installing a power plant in South 
Korea. Furthermore, we also find evidences that in order 
to put more pressure on the Korean counterpart, German 
government was considering more drastic measures such 
as the possibility of breaking off diplomatic ties with 
South Korea (volume 480, inventory 37). 
We can also retrieve several important mutual 
correspondences between the South Korean President, 
Park, and the German Federal President, L~~bke,  
regarding this incident. They were already on friendly 
terms due to the exchange state visits. In a series of 
confidential writings from the high level officials from 
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both sides, one can foresee that the presidential pardon 
will be eventually granted to the Korean nationals who 
were accused in Seoul of espionage for North Korea. The 
archival materials also contain evidences suggesting that 
the U S  Embassy in Seoul was trying to mediate between 
South Korea and Germany regarding this affair. 
Of course, this highly charged political affair provided 
North Korean government in Pyongyang with some good 
reason to criticize the South Korean government. In fact, 
we find an official North Korean statement on this issue 
at  the archival material of the former East Germany on 
North Korea (cf. official communiqu~ from the North 
Korean foreign ministry on September 19, 1967, 
C 1086 / 70 Ministeriurn f iir Ausw artige Angelegenheit) in 
which North Korea criticizes the anti-communist policy of 
President Park and the American imperialism regarding 
this incident. 
Finally, South Korea and West Germany have agreed 
to normalize their relations in January 1969, which were 
strained by the alleged kidnapping case. A German 
special presidential envoy, Dr. Frank, is dispatched to 
South Korea to end the uncomfortable tensions between 
Seoul and Bonn (cf. Bestand 37, Band 479, 1969). It 
took almost three years to end the political and 
diplomatic dilemma between the two countries. 
N. Educational implication of this study 
In recent years the public in South Korea have been 
following up with keen interest the political discourse on 
how to come to terms with the past. It is also a well 
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known fact that the successive military regimes in South 
Korea have violated democratic principles and human 
rights in the past. The East-Berlin Affair is considered 
one of those cases that call for an objective clarification 
from the government side. Aside from the domestic 
political matters in Korea at that time, we can gain some 
objective understanding on how both South Korea and 
Germany dealt with this matter reciprocally in the past ,if 
we investigate the (un)official archival materials on this 
issue. The fact-based discussions in this paper help to 
raise political consciousness and promote political 
education required for a democratic society to develop 
internal democratic processes and promote international 
relations. At the same time, the research conducted here 
seeks to create a vitally necessary dialogic context to 
continue the fact-based dialogues between the past and 
the present that ensure a mutual base and common 
ground to explore the sometimes irreducible differences 
between people's political values and attitudes. 
V. Conclusion 
This study analyzed the so-called East-Berlin Affair in 
the late 1960s which is considered the single most 
important political and diplomatic affair between South 
Korea and West Germany. In this research we presented 
an overview of the related archival materials available at 
the political archives of the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Berlin. From the political archive of the 
German Foreign Ministry we find a good deal of materials 
regarding this unfortunate diplomatic affair between 
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South Korea and West Germany. Given the fact that the 
South Korean nationals suspected of espionage activities 
against South Korea were forced to leave for Seoul 
suddenly and that the intelligence officials from South 
Korea were involved in the German territory, it is natural 
that the West German government became very upset 
with this diplomatic affair. Eventually Korean government 
released the accused Korean nationals who were later 
found guilty of espionage against South Korea. However, 
we have noticed some differences in diplomatic strategies 
between the two countries for solving the case at issue. 
From the beginning the German government demanded 
from Seoul that the concerned Korean nationals be 
released and returned to West Germany immediately 
because only by doing so would the violated diplomatic 
relation be normalized. The archival sources of the 
Gennan side also reveal that the German foreign ministry 
was under enormous political pressure from both the 
public opinions and the parliament. On the other hand, 
whereas from early on the Korean government expressed 
regret to the German government that South Korea 
committed a severe diplomatic mistake on the Gennan 
soil by deploying government officials unlawfully, the 
government in Seoul insisted on investigating the 
concerned people and bringing the accused to court. 
Finally, the German government threatened the Korean 
government with the possibility of stopping development 
aids and projects. Even though the Gennan demands 
were all met, it took almost three years to end the 
uneasy case between the two countries. In this research 
we have dealt with the diplomatic materials from the 
German political archive only. However, the present 
author shares the view that other materials and sources 
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such as individual letters and private archives regarding 
this case will contribute substantially to the further 
research for a more accurate and objective account of the 
entire case. 
It is hoped that the research conducted here can 
contribute to enhancing a vitally necessary dialogic 
context to continue the fact-based dialogues between the 
past and the present in the political environments in and 
out of Korea. 
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